

To: Kent Flood Risk Management Committee – 6th March 2017

From: Michael Harrison, Chairman of Kent Flood Risk Management Committee

Subject: KRF Exercise Surge Debrief Report

Classification: Unrestricted

Summary: To update Kent Flood Risk Management Committee on the areas for improvement, areas of good practice and recommendations from the Kent Resilience Forum 2016/17 annual exercise. Members are asked to note the content of the multi-agency debrief report.

1. Background

1.1 Kent Flood Risk Management Committee received a verbal update on Exercise Surge, which took place between 27th and 29th September 2016, at their July and November meetings.

1.2 The exercise scenario was based on countywide flooding resulting in large scale evacuation.

2. Debrief Report

2.1 The debrief report (at Appendix 1) begins with a summary that provides information about the aim, objectives and scale of the annual KRF exercise 2016 – Exercise Surge.

2.2 The debrief report captures the areas for improvement and the areas of good practice that were identified by exercise planners and participants during the debrief process.

2.3 The debrief process resulted in 20 recommendations to enable multi-agency partners to continue to improve the county's ability to respond to a flood event of the size and scale of the scenario used for Exercise Surge.

3. Summary of Key Lessons Learned

- 3.1 The success of Exercise Surge was achieved through the positive engagement from the multi-agency resilience community during both the planning for and the delivery of the exercise.
- 3.2 The exercise devoted a whole day to the Recovery phase following an incident of the size and scale of Exercise Surge. There will be a further local authority led Recovery Table Top exercise in 2017 to consider the impacts on communities 6 months after a similar event.
- 3.3 The KRF will continue to test plans and train multi-agency staff against the Exercise Surge scenario in 2017/18, with specific events planned to continuously improve strategic level command and control, media and communications and evacuation capabilities.
- 3.4 Pan-Kent and Local Multi Agency flood plans will be updated further to the experiences of those who took part in the exercise.
- 3.5 Multi-agency tools and guidance will continue to be promoted to ensure the most efficient sharing of information, including mapping, during an emergency.

4. Next Steps

- 4.1 The lessons learned from Exercise Surge will be added to the KRF Lessons Learned database and allocated to the relevant working groups.
- 4.2 Progress against recommendations within the debrief report will be reported to the KRF Executive Group.

5. Recommendations

5.1 That Members:

- Note the content of the multi-agency debrief report.

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Background documents: None

Kent Resilience Forum

PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES IN KENT AND MEDWAY

APPENDIX 1**FINAL STRUCTURED DEBRIEF REPORT v1.0**

Debrief commissioned by:	Exercise Surge Director – Steve Scully, Senior Resilience Officer, Kent Resilience Team
Event:	KRF Exercise Surge
Date of Event:	27 th to 29 th September 2016
Date of Debriefs:	Ex Surge Planning Team – 6 th October 2016 Local Authorities – 3 rd November 2016 Multi-Agency – 14 th November 2016
Debrief Locations:	6 th October – Conference Room, KFRS SHQ 3 rd November – Maidstone Borough Council 14 th November – Conference Room, KFRS SHQ
Debrief Team:	Facilitator – Fiona Gaffney, KRT Supervisor (KCC) Scribes 6 th October – Claire Goff, KRT Support Officer 3 rd November – Andy Jeffery, Emergency Planning and Events Officer (CCC) 14 th November – Michelle Cheyne, KRT Admin and Project Officer
Debrief Participants:	Exercise Surge Multi-Agency Planning Team All Local Authorities Kent Police Kent Fire & Rescue Services Maritime & Coastguard Agency Environment Agency

NHS England
NHS CCG
NHS KCHT
Raynet

Debrief Summary:

This debrief was commissioned in order to capture learning points and best practise regarding Exercise Surge and the multi-agency engagement.

Exercise Surge had one strategic aim: to validate several key elements of the Kent Resilience Forums (KRF) Plans, Processes and Training in response to a significant countywide flood event.

There were 5 key shared objectives:

- Validate elements of the new KRF Evacuation and Shelter Plan (Evacuation Co-ordination Group and Transport Cell)
- Validate elements of the Pan Kent Flood Plan (Evacuation Use of Roads)
- Validate learning from the KRF Invicta Bronze (operational) training
- Validate all Multi-Agency flood plans as to their usefulness during an East Coast Surge
- Validate learning form KRF Exercises Hawk and Fort Invicta

During the exercise planning phase, each organisation was asked to identify its own objectives. Some key objectives that were explored during the debrief process include:

- Validate the Romney Marsh Division and Evacuation Plan
- Validate the Pan Kent Recovery Framework involving several District Councils
- Review Mass Shelter Capability
- Review TCC Operations with the new Evacuation Co-ordination Group
- Review TCC Operations with the new Transport Cell
- Validate emergency services' response to both Wet Rescue and Dry Evacuation
- Test the deployment of key flood defence equipment locally

The full 47 organisational objectives that were identified during the exercise planning process can be found in the Pre-exercise Briefing Document on the exercise Surge page on Resilience Direct.

The scale of exercise Surge can be summarised as follows:

- 9 months of exercise planning
- A planning team of 30 multi-agency representatives
- Over 800 people involved in the exercise
- Including 120 volunteers (and 10 dogs) evacuated with luggage
- 1 week of pre-exercise information including a SWAG teleconference
- 1 day of live play over 9 locations
- 1 whole day devoted to Recovery – a ‘first’ in terms of KRF exercises
- 50 subject matter experts supporting the Recovery exercise
- Over 600 individual documents supporting the exercise
- 144 injects produced for Day 1 alone
- 3 multi-agency structured debriefs resulting in 1 combined debrief report

The achievements of the Exercise Director and planning team in planning, facilitating and successfully delivering 1 live play exercise as well as 2 full day table top exercises were recognised throughout the debrief process. During the process, participants were asked to consider the different phases of the exercise:

- Planning
- Pre-exercise information
- Response (at 9 locations – excluding Lydd Airport)
- Recovery

In order to capture as much relevant details as possible to ensure that the learning reflected the strategic aim and key objectives, the debrief was structured to capture:

- Command and control
- Communications
- Resilience Direct
- Evacuation capability

This report will focus on areas for improvement and perceptions of what went well; it concludes with a series of recommendations to assist the Exercise Director and the Training and Exercise Group with the improvement, planning and management of future courses and exercises.

1. AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

1.1 Planning Process

ITEM	IDENTIFIED BY	REC. No.	Comments
<p>1.1.1 Information sharing was key to the success of the exercise. Due to the numbers of people involved the Exercise Support Team shared information with Single Points of Contact who could distribute it to their senior management and exercise players. During the debrief process it became apparent that some agencies either did not receive information during the exercise planning phase or did not distribute it further. Others described that they perceived that too much information was shared during the planning phase or that it could have been done in a more efficient way e.g. structured weekly alerts to updates on Resilience Direct.</p>	<p>Exercise Director / SDC / KRT Support / Raynet</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>There were issues with individual organisations' ICT filter blocking or quarantining information.</p>
<p>1.1.2 The Scope of Exercise Surge was agreed by KRF Strategic Group early in the planning phase and stated that the exercise must fall within the following parameters:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Take place in September 2016 • Stop at Tactical Level <p>A large number of participants at all 3 debriefs felt that Strategic level could have been included in an exercise of this scale and that their absence detracted from the realism. This was particularly relevant to the Media Cell and to the Recovery exercise. Others commented that their senior managers had missed an opportunity to be involved or tested in the SCG environment. A significant number also felt that the scope was too broad. Once the scenario was shared, the exercise grew as agencies wanting to include further areas to test. Some suggested that the planning team should "lock the scenario" well in advance of the actual exercise.</p>	<p>Media & Comms Group / LAEPG members / KCC / KFRS / NHS / Raynet</p>	<p>2 and 4</p>	<p>The rationale for not exercising Strategic Command and Control is that it has been regularly tested through recent incidents and exercises.</p> <p>See finding in 2.2 Command and Control</p>

<p>1.1.3 As the Scale of the Exercise increased so did the demand on resources across the multi-agency partnership. This had an impact on all partners' normal business delivery. There was a shared view that KRF should not run an exercise of this scale on an annual basis. There was a concern that capturing and acting on all the learning from this exercise could be lost because of the scale and resource involved. Some participants felt that they were not able to test themselves fully against their plans and capabilities because of the demand on resources for an exercise of this scale. For example, the Media Cell tested the Social Media element but want to test other elements e.g. live media. And some Local Authorities had a greater demand on resources than others. Shepway DC had to commit a greater resource because live play took place in Romney Marsh, whereas West Kent Local Authorities commented that they had "little to do". The scale of the exercise also stretched resources at KRT, in terms of administrative support, Excon and across the Umpires. The amount of administrative support required to deliver Day 1 meant that it was not available to deliver the same amount to Day 3.</p>	<p>Exercise Control / Comms / Shepway / NHS / Media Cell / LAEPG / KRT</p>	<p>3, 5 and 6</p>	<p>"If we identify the KRF exercise earlier, we can build it into everyone's work programmes" "we need to be mindful of capabilities and what can be achieved"</p>
<p>1.1.4 With regard to Exercise Timeline , the planning team felt that their key challenge was getting organisations to engage and provide realistic 'injects' for the Local Authorities Tactical Table Top and the Recovery Exercise. Participants felt that there were not enough injects in the afternoon. The SWAG briefing and completion of the SITREP prior to the exercise meant that work had already begun in advance of the injects being received e.g. focus points had already been identified. Injects and scripts were at times repetitive. At times they came from Excon and then from TCC. Local Authorities had a view that the scenario build had been so successful that the injects became irrelevant.</p>	<p>Planning Team/ SDC/ KCC/ NHS/ LAEPG</p>	<p>7</p>	

1.2 Pre-exercise information			
1.2.1 There was a lot of information distributed during the build-up, and non-Emergency Planning officers in some districts felt overwhelmed by it. It wasn't clear to some how much resource was required during the build-up.	Dover / Tonbridge / Ashford / KCC / Thanet / Maidstone / Medway	1	Some district SPOCs filtered or summarised the information in order to prevent this, either as standard practice or in response to feedback.
1.2.2 The SWAG wasn't as interactive as in real incidents, with not so much detail or input from districts.	TMBC, MBC, SBC		No action required. SWAG tested during Storm Katie and Storm Angus.
1.2.3 In the pre-exercise briefing document the objectives for the exercise were too broad and should be more specific i.e. not "test the flood plan" but "test the trigger levels in the flood plan".	MC, KCC	2	
1.2.4 The SITREP form was difficult to complete, repetitive, and too long. The timing of the SITREP was queried at LAEPG and the Exercise Director advised that it had been a realistic event in terms of notional reporting at national level.	SBC, DDC, TMBC	8	This is a national form.

1.3 Command and Control			
<p>1.3.1 The planning aims for Command and Control were Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) focused and didn't involve Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). However in order for certain aspects of the exercise to have worked SCG involvement was required.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The recovery exercise would have benefitted from input from STAC on Day 1. • The sign off for press releases and media guidance was unrealistic as they report to SCG during an incident. • KCC and other Local Authorities commented that the absence of SCG and direct guidance impacted on Tactical level • Lack of SCG made the declaration of the emergency unrealistic 	KCC / Public Health / LAEPG	2 and 4	Exercise Director confirmed that planning group was only given the direction that TCG should be playing. However as the time line grew it was clear that SCG guidance was required.
<p>1.3.2 Transfer of Lead Agency from Environment Agency to Kent Police. LAEPG commented that in reality it is difficult to move from one to the other, however, it felt unusually easy during the exercise.</p>	MBC, TDC, TMBC		This may be due to lessons learned from the winter 2013/14 floods where this process was found to be too time-consuming.
<p>1.3.3 Local Authorities were able to dial in to Tactical Co-ordinating Group meetings. The structure of the TCG meetings meant that those dialling in from Oakwood had to sit through a lot of discussion around the other sites, delaying them from activity during the table top exercise. There was no response from the TCC after the flooded property information was sent through. This would be overcome in reality as Local Authorities would be based in the Multi-Agency Room. TCG can take a while to pull together; main issues were technology, especially fire wall issues. Video conferencing wasn't great and sound was poor. The CEC dialled into TCG's and stopped everyone working and listened into the call, they did this as a training tool. However, SDC were then unable to dial in to speak to the CEC.</p>	SBC / TMBC / Shepway	9 and 10	Silver Commander would have arranged the TCG agenda in order of priority, hence dry evacuation etc. taking precedence in the running order.

<p>1.3.4 Tactical Table Top Exercise. As Medway, the districts and boroughs were in the same room at the table top they were able to talk to each other, but there as little communication between them and the CEC. NHS reported that no requests for health support from the districts/boroughs. Shepway had its Emergency Centre open and communicated with CEC and was able to provide a manager to dial in to TCG but was unable to resource a presence at TCC. Communications were therefore challenging. The emphasis on ICT communications was hampered by poor Wi-Fi at Oakwood House and ICT problems experienced by some districts. Those at the TTEEx did feel that TCG focussed on the evacuation at Littlestone and did not adequately cover the evacuation needs of the districts that were playing at Oakwood House.</p>	<p>KCC / NHS / SDC / LAEPG</p>		<p>KRT are currently reviewing Oakwood House's suitability as a venue for future exercises</p>
<p>1.3.5 Members of the Evacuation Cell felt that they did not receive a lot of information from colleagues based in the Multi-Agency room. Information from TCC however was very consistent. The cell was on a different floor and technology was an issue. In an event of this scale the TCC may not be able to accommodate the Evacuation Cell on site. There was a question within the Evacuation Cell as to whether they should be obtaining guidance and updates from the TCG or obtaining this information from their own organisations sitting in the multi-agency room. Members of LAEPG also admitted to a lack of knowledge of the KRF Evacuation and Shelter Plan.</p>	<p>Highways England / Kent Police / LAEPG</p>	<p>9,10 and 11</p>	<p>The plan was written so the evacuation cell could sit outside the TCC environment.</p>
<p>1.3.6 Internal communications for Kent Police inside the Tactical Co-ordination Centre was clear, but the Silver Commander has accepted that his briefing should have been consistent and directed to the multi-agency room too. Clear briefings should have given to all organisations so they understood the scope of the day.</p>	<p>Kent Police</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>The KRF Tactical Command training is being reviewed in 16/17 for delivery in 17/18.</p>

<p>1.3.7 The County Emergency Centre was the Welfare Cell and the County's focus in terms of the co-ordination of welfare provision. In an incident of this scale it is recognised that the management of evacuation and welfare is complex. There is an acknowledgement that more work is required to develop the process and ensure it works effectively.</p>	<p>KCC</p>	<p>11</p>	<p>KRF Humanitarian Welfare Group is being tasked with reviewing how evacuation, transport and welfare cells can be more efficient and effective.</p>
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1.4 Communications			
1.4.1 The Airwave Interoperability channel was available but was not used across all agencies.	Kent Police / Excon / KFRS / SECAMB / MCA	12	This issue has been highlighted in the last 3 KRF exercises.
1.4.2 NHS and other agencies reported issues sending e-mails to Kent Police during the day. It was clear that an IT communication check was not carried out prior to the exercise by all partner organisations at external sites. RAYNET carried out the airwaves, teleconference and live feed checks prior to the exercise.	NHS / LAEPG	10	

1.5 Media Cell			
<p>1.5.1 During the exercise planning phase the KRF Media and Communications Group had determined that the Media Cell would be co-located at TCC. There were communication issues as Media representatives at both Oakwood House and TCG didn't have e-mail access. The inclusion of pseudo media enquiries (other than social media) would have prompted more discussion between colleagues. Shepway media messages needed to be shared within a timely manner, but due to no SCG sitting and them having to communicate with TCC Media Cell and the ICT issues, media responses were delayed. Musterpoint was only used by Shepway but was found to be effective. However the focus was on Twitter feed whereas in reality Facebook has a greater impact in the community.</p>	Media Cell	6	<p>The rationale for locating the Media Cell at TCC is that there was no SCG.</p> <p>Specific feedback on Musterpoint will be discussed at the KRF Media and Comms Group.</p> <p>Chair of group is arranging a meeting with Kent Police / KFRS / and KCC Media Heads and Strategic Leads to improve joint-working.</p>

1.6 Resilience Direct & Mapping

<p>1.6.1 There is a general acknowledgement that KRF are not using RD to its full capability during the Response phase. The RD mapping representative at the TCC and exercise control advised that the system was not used to its full potential during Exercise Surge. The Environment Agency tactical command team were unaware of RD mapping, but the EA mapping team was aware of the system and had worked with Ordnance Survey to upload maps prior to the exercise. Paper maps were used on the day. The EA are looking at working with RD mapping team so we can use there system in the future/for back up. NHS reported that the maps in RD have gaps in terms of Health and that NHS and Social Care use SHAPE mapping.</p>	<p>Kent Police / Environment Agency / KRT / NHS</p>	<p>13, 14</p>	
<p>1.6.2 LAEPG reported that organisations were not looking at the same maps. LA would work towards defended, but EA worked towards the un-defended. LAEPG need clarification on what maps should be used to enable them to update their planning assumptions and assess resource needs. All agreed that maps should be displayed on RD for all partners to view but that general RD awareness needs to be raised across partners.</p>	<p>LAEPG</p>	<p>14</p>	
<p>1.6.3 The following sections of the new Local Multi-Agency Flood Plans needed revision by districts;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The list of vulnerable people/properties wasn't up-to-date; • The LMAFP didn't represent the worst case scenario, or the level above which the districts wouldn't be able to cope; • Integrate with the Flood Appendix from Community Resilience Plans; • More information on mutual aid 	<p>MC, TMBC, KCC, SBC, MBC</p>	<p>15</p>	

1.7 Live Play – Wet Rescue & Evacuation Assembly Point			
1.7.1 The Wet Rescue aspect of the exercise was well received but outgrew the original scope. All aims and objectives were met.	KFRS	2	
1.7.2 There was a perception that the Evacuation Assembly Point was slow and that the Community Wardens had nothing to do. In reality they would have assisted with door knocking. This exercise tested the point after door knocking would have taken place. A significant number of debrief participants commented that the door-knocking and evacuation element needs to be tested again. The majority agreed that the following questions have not been answered sufficiently by Exercise Surge: a) How long would it take to evacuate an area b) What do we do when residents do not respond? c) What staff resources do we need? d) How is information captured?	LAEPG / Kent Police	16	

1.8 Evacuation and Shelter			
<p>1.8.1 KCC Highways and Transportation team felt that the Romney Marsh Diversion plan was not fully tested, as communication regarding traffic issues were dealt with by TCC and not communicated and linked to the plan. Royal Haskoning, Consultations Team didn't link in with transport cell. They were more people and infrastructure focused. The injects linking to diversion routes seem to remain with Kent Police and not communicated to the transport cell. Shepway were awaiting injects and communications regarding the plan, but didn't receive anything.</p>	KCC / Highways England / Shepway	17	
<p>1.8.2 Exercise Surge highlighted the number of resources that would be required to staff multiple welfare centres. Welfare Centre Training for staff and managers is included as core training in the KRF Training and exercise programme. LAEPG has previously considered the minimum number of staff in each district / borough who should be trained in these roles. There is a need to improve partnership working with neighbouring authorities around mutual aid, particularly as districts restructure and shrink, in order that the response to a major incident isn't compromised.</p>	NHS / LAEPG	15 and 18	<p>Guidance – only 2 centres per district should be opened at one time</p> <p>KRF Humanitarian Welfare group will recommence in the New Year with KCC in the Chair.</p>
<p>1.8.3 LAEPG was not clear as to who would be responsible for managing the Evacuation Hub at Detling. There was an assumption that it would be Maidstone BC, as it falls within their district, with costs charged to Shepway, for example, where people were evacuated from Romney Marsh.</p>	LAEPG	11	

1.9 Welfare Centre			
<p>1.9.1 Whilst the welfare centre was well staffed and a large number of evacuees and dogs were processed, there were a number of improvements identified regarding information sharing.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was no initial briefing by the rest Centre Manager to evacuees. • There was a lack of communication between the nursing team and the team in main hall. Regular meetings should have taken place. • Information points weren't staffed and there were no regular updates to evacuees. • There was no Romanian language card, even though one of the scripts referred to the evacuee as being from Romania. 	SBC / NHS / ABC	18	
<p>1.9.2 Vulnerable people – information sharing There are still some inconsistencies in understanding what information can and should be shared in an emergency. There is a need to be clear about the definition of who is “vulnerable”, different agencies have different definitions.</p>	NHS / Medway	19	Information Sharing Protocol
<p>1.9.3 The documentation process in the Welfare Centre failed as staff had not been available to attend training. Further training has since been arranged. Wristbands didn't match luggage tickets, which has the potential to cause confusion</p>	KRT / KCC / NHS / ABC / MC	18	The luggage process has been included in the Welfare Centre Training package

1.10 Recovery and Business Continuity			
1.11 The hand over from response to recovery worked well for the exercise, but it was recognised that the response phase would have been running alongside the recovery planning phase. If SCG (including STAC and a Recovery Advisory Group) had met during the exercise on the first day this would have made it more realistic.	KCC / LAEPG	1, 2	Rationale: The handover to recovery had been tested in Fort Invicta and Operation Perch (July)
1.12 On the day time wasn't given to allow each organisation to really test their plans on recovery and BC. Too many speakers for a table top which resulted in inject session being compressed. It would be useful to have an exercise dedicated to recovery only, looking at the longer term issues.	KCC / LAEPG	4	
1.14 It is not clear how well districts are promoting Business Continuity to local businesses	KCC	20	This has been added to the KRF Business Continuity Group agenda.
1.13 As the players on Days 1 & 3 were mostly different, there were continuity issues including; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The number of properties estimated to be flooded on Day 1 vs actual number given on map handouts on Day 3 (generally much lower) • Assumptions about whether rest centres were still open or not, especially in districts that were providing mutual aid. • Flood zone maps used from day 1 and on day 3 changed the numbers significantly. 	KCC	4	

2. Areas of good practice

2.1 Planning Process

Top end of what we could expect in scenario. Products produced were realistic for a real time incident.			
Starting the alerts on the Sunday before, products provided from Met Office/ EA was great.	EA		Group agreed was right scenario.
The information that was sent out during the build up to the exercise was realistic for the scenario.			
Liked having the information sent to the SPOC, allowed the email to be personalised.	District		

2.2 Command and control

The SWAG was a useful tool for engaging exercise players in the scenario prior to Day 1, and helped them understand how Command & Control worked.	ABC, SBC, KCC		
Being able to watch the TCG take place via video link in Oakwood House was very useful.	TMBC		
Transport from carpark to TCC well organised and used by all. Not too sure whether we can always resource this during an incident, but for exercises we will use the process again.	Kent Police		

2.3 Local Authorities

Some Local Authorities were able to resource their rest centres	SBC, SBC, MC, TDC, ABC		
The exercise (on both Days 1 & 3) allowed Local Authorities to build good relationships with counterparts in neighbouring authorities, which will assist where mutual aid and partnership working is required during future real incidents.	TMBC		
Injects worked well, couple of injects were in other areas but the districts worked together to resolve them. Sometimes injects get repeated from other exercises; require ideas from agencies maybe throughout the year.	KRT Support		
White board communications worked well and were well co-ordinated.	KCC		

2.4 Communications			
Positive feedback and comms worked well on site. Using local fire station as a holding area worked well. JESIP worked well, including other agencies. Venue great, met all of the needs of the scenario.	Wet Rescue		
Raynet did an excellent job and their work enhanced the exercise for players.	All		
Video footage was fantastic could see what was going on in the county. Thank you to Raynet.	KRT Support	1	
Raynet – live feeds from all locations Shepway and Oakwood House gratefully received the live feeds from Littlestone as it made them feel like they were part of a live incident. TCG teleconference in the room at Oakwood House allowed staff to listen in and learn about the TCG aspect to command and control and response to an incident.	LAEPG		
2.5 Live Play			
First time we used aircraft in that environment which worked well.	MCGA		
Two different trusts working together which worked really well.	NHS		
Evac Assembly Point (Sea Cadet Hut) was brilliant, very accommodating.	KRT		
Feedback received was that 99% felt confident that organisations would respond well in an emergency.			
Felt Musterpoint was very valuable to use within the exercise.	Kent Police		
Deployment of barriers went well.	EA		
Public warning and informing on the ground – did engage with local community and media. Press release went out prior to leaflet drop to residents.	Exercise Director / SDC/KFRS		
2.6 Observer programme			
Observer programme worked well on the day and all in attendance has have given positive feedback	All		
Kent Police silver command expressed his thanks to the KFRS silver commander with the way he conducted and co-ordinated the white boards.	Kent Police		
2.7 Survivor reception centre			
Luggage storage and pets processes worked well and have been embedded into Welfare Centre Guidelines.	LAEPG		This action has already been completed
Health took away an action to change in the system for mental health issues.	NHS		Already being worked on.
Sussex RF attended and was able to answered some of their own questions regarding evacuation assemble points and survivor reception centres.	KRT		

The overall process of evacuation went well at Littlestone	ABC		
95% of evacuees at the survivor reception centre felt they were looked after and kept updated on the incident.	KRT		
2.8 Recovery and Business Continuity Table Top			
Positive engagement from all partners	KCC		
Fitting end to a good exercise	All		
Table experts was a great idea although not consistently used	LAEPG		
There was a good response from KCC Social Care when contacted	SBC		
It was a great achievement to get the county talking about recovery – there was good attendance, and Katie Stewart was praised for her good grasp of the recovery process.	All		
Recovery phase went up to day 5, felt it worked well. Everybody seemed happy.	KRT		
The energy and activity was great on day 3.	Exercise Director		

No.	3. RECOMMENDATIONS	OWNER	COMMENTS
1	<p>During the KRF exercise planning phase the appointed Exercise Director will project manage the planning process and this will be supported by a Project Communication Plan to set the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance • Single points of contact for each agency • Definition of the SPOC role in communicating exercise information back into their individual organisation • The use of Resilience Direct as the primary source of information • Communication of pre-exercise briefings and related information • JESIP protocol and procedures • The use of briefings at STARTEX • Pre-exercise media communications • Post-exercise media communications • Debrief process • Communication of Final Report 	KRF Training and Exercise Group	
2	<p>During the KRF exercise planning phase the appointed Exercise Director will project manage the planning process and this will be supported by a Project Plan with SMART targets including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The scope of the exercise agreed by KRF Executive Group • A review of the exercise project plan by KRF Training and Exercise Group against the scope with any need for change to be reported back to KRF Executive Group • Clear and specific objectives relating to the plans and capabilities that are being validated with measurable outcomes • Budget monitoring and reporting • A cut-off date for inject or scenarios 	KRF Training and Exercise Group	
3	The KRF Training and Exercise Group will develop a medium-term outline Training and	KRF Training and Exercise Group	

No.	3. RECOMMENDATIONS	OWNER	COMMENTS
	Exercise Programme (3-yearly) and deliver a large-scale multi-agency exercise at least once and no more than twice in that cycle.		
4	Deliver an off-the-shelf Exercise Surge SCG product to test organisation's Strategic Commanders in their roles.	Kent Resilience Team	
5	Continue to train and exercise against the Exercise Surge scenario and expand on the Recovery table top exercise. Deliver a Recovery Exercise based on "Surge + 6 months" to test partners' abilities to support the community in the return to normality in the longer term.	KRF Training and Exercise Group	
6	Continue to train and exercise against the Exercise Surge scenario and test the KRF Media and Communications Plan elements that were not covered by the exercise including the management of real media and the use of real media to warn and inform the community. Test the cell's capacity to work 'virtually'.	KRF Media and Communications Group	
7	Develop and deliver a pilot exercise based on a timeline where the 'scenario builds' rather than developing new time pressured injects.	Kent Resilience Team	
8	Explore ways to make the SITREP form easier to use by Local Authorities and other agencies, either by including it in future training and exercises or by tailoring it to be a local document that meets the requirements of the national document.	Kent Resilience Team	
9	Review the video and teleconference facilities and Wi-Fi capability in all rooms designated for multi-agency accommodation at TCG to ensure that they are fit for purpose.	Kent Police	
10	All partners must be responsible for ensuring that their ICT is compatible with Kent Police's Wi-Fi__33 network and should arrange time to test their hardware. All partners must ensure that they have WiFi access in their Emergency Centres. As a minimum requirement, Partners must be prepared to deliver their function without ICT capability and should build this into their own Business Continuity Management.	All Partners	
11	Review, update and circulate the KRF Evacuation and Shelter Plan to reflect: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The relationship between the Evacuation Co-ordination Cell and the TCC/CEC. • The Media and Communications content i.e. pre-prepared messages • Which organisation manages the Evacuation Hub 	KRF Evacuation and Shelter Task and Finish Group	

No.	3. RECOMMENDATIONS	OWNER	COMMENTS
12	Incorporate the current JESIP guidelines into Incident Communications Plans.	Local JESIP board	Airways – Multi Agency Channel
13	Develop a Resilience Direct training and awareness programme to improve its use by all partners.	KRT	
14	Complete the multi-agency work required to ensure that all partners are working from the same maps and that they are available using the Resilience Direct mapping tool.	KRF Pan Kent Flood Group	
15	<p>Review and update Local Multi-Agency Flood Plans to include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The list of vulnerable people/properties • The planning assumption (see 14) in terms of worst case scenario • Integrate with the Flood Appendix from Community Resilience Plans; • More co-ordinated mutual aid arrangements 	Pan Kent Flood Group / LAEPG	Discuss Mutual Aid at the next LAEPG
16	<p>Continue to train and exercise against the Exercise Surge scenario and conduct a feasibility exercise to test the KRF Evacuation and Shelter Plan and confirm</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How long it takes to evacuate a specific area • What information do you provide • What resources are required 	KRF Training and Exercise Group	Requested by LAEPG
17	Continue to train and exercise against the Exercise Surge scenario and test the Romney Marsh Diversion Plan.	KRT / Shepway DC	
18	Complete a Training Needs Analysis for Welfare Centre Managers and Staff required to staff 2 welfare centres for a period of 24 hours and ensure that the KRF Welfare Centre training is internally promoted. Amend welfare centre training to take into account issues around documentation, information provision, luggage, translating. Ensure that it is promoted effectively in organisations.	KCC / Medway / Districts / Boroughs / KRT	
20	Recovery should be a standing item at LAEPG and KRF Business Continuity Group.	Local Authority Emergency Planning Group / KRF BC Group	